-4-recipients of public assistance, with few exceptions, work or prepare for work. What are the likely interactions between SSI and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the main cash welfare program? Now that TANF is no longer an entitlement, and control of TANF policies is largely in state hands, will the role of SSI in the social safety net change?
Of special importance is the question of whom the program should serve. The boundaries separating the working-age and child populations eligible for SSI from those eligible for other income-based benefits are imprecise and fluid, as we shall later show, and their demarcation is a political almost as much as it is a medical decision. The persistence of high poverty rates among children, even during the long and robust economic expansion of the 1990s, suggests that some form of income maintenance program must remain a crucial part of the social safety net. But should SSI play that role?
In this article we review the role that SSI has played to this point, examining in particular the evidence regarding its behavioral and labor market effects on the population of working-age adults. We briefly consider the directions SSI might take in a work-dominated welfare environment with a multiplicity of state and federal programs.
The Rationale for SSI
In 1972, Congress rejected the Nixon administration's Family Assistance Plan (FAP), the first serious attempt to institute a federal program that would provide support for all low-income families. But it passed legislation creating SSI, largely because providing income assistance to people not then expected to work seemed unlikely to have much effect on employment. Through SSI, Congress federalized the administration of benefits, set minimum benefit standards, imposed uniform eligibility criteria, and set relatively low benefit reduction rates on earnings from work. But at the very beginning of the program, Congress began to blur the traditional 1. For further discussion see S. Nagi, Disability and Rehabilitation: Legal, Clinical, and SelfConcepts of Measurement (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969) , and "Disability Concepts Revisited: Implications to Prevention," in Disability in America: Toward a National Agenda for Prevention, ed. A. Pope and A. Tarlov (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991) . A useful discussion of disability measurement also can be found in Jette A., and E. Badley, Conceptual Issues in -5-ability-to-work standard for determining who should be entitled to public welfare payments. By extending benefits to the needy families of disabled children, SSI expanded the social safety net to include families headed by adults who were "employable."
The goals of SSI have not changed, but the program itself has undergone extensive legislative and administrative revisions over the years. These have sought primarily to make the criteria for disability more precise (the term generally used is "target effective") and to encourage recipients to return to the workforce. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, for example, allowed recipients to deduct some work expenses from earnings, thus in effect raising the level of allowable earnings. And in the 1996 welfare reform legislation, Congress restricted the eligibility of noncitizens for SSI, out of a belief that the program had become a magnet for newly arrived noncitizens with immigration sponsors.
Qualifying for the Program

The categorical criteria
The first two criteria for SSI eligibility-age and blindness-are straightforward and easily determined. Disability screening is more complex, and has been extremely controversial.
First, there is no simple definition of disability. The most common measure in the economics literature distinguishes three components: the presence of (1) a pathology-a physical or mental malfunction-that leads to (2) an impairment-a physiological, anatomical, or mental loss or abnormality-that results in (3) an inability to perform, or limitation in performing, socially expected roles and tasks.
1 For men, and increasingly for women, market work is a socially Screening children has proved more complex and contentious than screening adults. The originally stringent criteria for eligibility were broadened in 1990 as a result of the U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Sullivan v. Zebley. This decision held that to meet the standard of equal treatment, the initial determination of disability must include a functional limitation component parallel to that of adults-for example, certain schooling difficulties should be considered ground for eligibility. With the addition of these new and broader grounds, the SSI child caseload, about 185,000 in 1989, began to grow rapidly, reaching 955,000 by 1996. In that year -7-Congress, as part of the welfare reform legislation, again raised the bar for eligibility by redefining the criteria and since then program growth as been slower.
The economic criteria
To be eligible for SSI an individual must have "countable income" less than the federal benefit rate, $9,360 per year in 2002, and "countable assets" below $2,000 (for couples, the amounts are 150 percent of the individual rate). Not all income is countable: $65 a month in earnings are disregarded. Thereafter, for every dollar earned, a recipient loses $0.50 in SSI benefits. In-kind assistance like food stamps and public housing subsidies and $20 in income from other sources are disregarded, but all other government benefits are taxed at 100 percent. If someone eligible for SSI lives with others who are not-a spouse, or working-age parents-a portion of the income of those others is also considered in determining the amount of the SSI payment.
Although the federal benefit rate and thus the monthly income test rise with inflation every year, the income disregards, the asset limits, and the value of assets that are allowed (a car, or household goods) have never changed, and have fallen substantially in real terms since 1974, eroding the value of the SSI benefits and narrowing the population of potential recipients. In 2002 dollars, for example, the $65 earnings disregard would be $275; the $2,000 asset limit for an individual would be $6,345. The population now eligible for SSI is thus smaller and more economically disadvantaged than it was in 1974.
SSI Benefits
In general, SSI beneficiaries with no countable income receive the maximum monthly benefit ($545 for an individual, $817 for a couple in 2002. Although the original objective of SSI was to guarantee an income at the poverty level, the federal minimum benefit in fact never 2. In 1975, state supplements accounted for about 27 percent of all SSI payments. By 1998, the state proportion had declined to 13 percent of the total.
-8-represented more than about 75 percent of the poverty threshold for an eligible individual (90 percent for a couple). SSI recipients are required by law to apply for every government program for which they may be eligible. In most states, they are automatically eligible for food stamps and Medicaid. A majority of states pay an SSI supplement, but several factors minimize the importance of these.
For example, only 23 states provide supplements to the vast majority of SSI recipients living independently in their own households. Because state supplements are not annually adjusted for inflation, the real value of the median payment to individuals declined by about 60 percent between 1975 and 1997.
As a federal income maintenance program, SSI is funded from general revenues and the federal government pays the bulk of the benefits.
2 States thus have an incentive to move individuals to SSI from state programs, including TANF, which is federally financed as a fixed block grant that does not rise as caseloads increase. This fiscal incentive may well explain the active role state welfare agencies play in SSI outreach programs.
Profile of SSI Recipients
Demographic composition of the SSI rolls
As the basis of eligibility and the age composition of SSI recipients have changed, a number of other key demographic characteristics also have changed ( Figure 2 ). First, the proportion of males and non-whites has increased. So too has the number of noncitizens, which shrank when restrictions were imposed in 1996, but still constitutes about 11 percent of the SSI Table 1. -9-population. Second, the number of recipients qualifying on the basis of physical disability has shrunk, and over 35 percent of the caseload now is qualified on the ground of psychiatric disorders (the percentage qualifying by virtue of mental retardation has remained essentially stable).
What proportion of people who meet the categorical, economic, and citizenship tests for SSI are actually participating? We can provide only a rough approximation, using census data.
We estimate that the participation rate of the poor elderly declined from around 79 percent in 1974 to about 54 percent in 1982; it has fluctuated since then, but no more than two-thirds of poor, elderly people now receive SSI benefits. Participation rates among poor people of working age, in contrast, have risen, especially during the 1990s; in 1998, 20 percent of this group were SSI recipients, up from 15 percent in 1974. Recipiency rates for poor children also increased rapidly over the 1990s but remain in comparison low-around 6.6 percent in 1998.
3 Increases in disability rates did not cause the changes; these rates have not risen since 1980.
Multiple program participation among SSI beneficiaries
As SSI policies mandate, a large fraction of SSI beneficiaries participate in other government programs (Table 1 ). In 1999, nearly all SSI recipients received Medicaid-89.4 percent. A substantial fraction also received Medicare-41.4 percent in 1999; forty percent were also receiving Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, on the ground either of retirement 4. The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI). Old Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) is the benefit generally known as "social security." Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI or DI) provides payments to individuals who have worked for the required period and are judged to be disabled under the SSA guidelines. It is not meanstested, but does have restrictions on labor earnings. The Social Security Administration also administers the SSI program.
-10-or disability. 4 In the same year, 40 percent of SSI beneficiaries lived in households receiving food stamps, over 5 percent were receiving the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and another 25 percent were receiving free or reducedprice meals. One in ten received energy or housing assistance. Over time, the proportion receiving social security and Medicare has declined, while the proportion receiving other public benefits has risen. The fact that a growing share of SSI recipients receive benefits from multiple means-tested programs suggests that the work incentives faced by the typical beneficiary are increasingly complex. We discuss how this potentially affects the behavior of SSI beneficiaries later in this article.
Factors Affecting SSI Participation
Supply of and demand for benefits
While application for SSI disability benefits is a function of health, it also is influenced by the eligibility criteria of income support programs, both social insurance and means-tested, the generosity of their benefits relative to work, macroeconomic conditions, and the applicant's education and job skills. In this brief discussion we look first at the evidence regarding caseload dynamics and the supply of benefits, and then at the demand for benefits.
The supply of benefits has fluctuated over time, largely as the stringency of the screening regulations has fluctuated. From the mid-1970s through the Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980, the disability determination and review process was steadily screwed 6. Moral hazard is formally defined as the risk that the presence of a contract (in this case a social contract to provide benefits) will affect the behavior of one or more of the contract parties. The classic example is in the insurance industry, where coverage against a loss might increase the risk-taking behavior of the insured.
-12-rate was associated with a 2 percent increase in applications. have often acted as intermediaries in the complicated SSI application process to make these transfers easier.
Program Incentives and Caseload Dynamics
Like all public assistance policies, programs for the disabled must contend with potential "moral hazard" problems and with work disincentives induced by program rules. 6 Because the United States has few program alternatives that offer long-term benefits to working-age persons who are not working, the relatively generous benefits and imperfect screening mechanisms in 7. In 1992, 70 percent of men and women who reported a health-related impairment said it started during their work life. R. Burkhauser and M. Daly, "Employment and Economic Well-Being Following the Onset of a Disability: The Role for Public Policy." In J. Mashaw, V. Reno, R.V.Burkhauser, and M. Berkowitz (eds.) Disability, Work, and Cas Benefits (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute, 1996).
-13-SSI could pose significant work disincentives for persons with disabilities who are considering applying for benefits. Additionally, the high marginal tax rates associated with multiple program participation could discourage exit from it and entry into the labor force. These same factors potentially affect the labor market decisions of adults with disabled children on SSI.
If those with disabilities were not expected to work, the bundle of program disincentives we have discussed above would be irrelevant. Marginal tax rates could approach 100 percent with no change in work behavior. Moreover, to the degree that age and work disability are clearly defined and immutable categories, differences in guarantees, time limits, or funding mechanisms for SSI and other programs would have little effect; the size of the SSI program would primarily reflect the prevalence of health limitations among low-income families. But neither the definition of disability nor the condition itself are immutable. And if work is both possible and expected for people with disabilities who meet other eligibility criteria, then policy discussions of SSI must consider such issues as, for example, the trade-offs among tax rates, guarantees, and break-even points.
In the United States, the typical working-age person with a disability acquired that disability at some point during his or her work life.
7 Social policy may, therefore, influence not only whether such workers remain in the labor force or end up in a transfer program, but also the speed at which the transition takes place. Thus the behavioral responses to worsening health depend not only on the severity of the condition but also on the social environment for people -14-with health impairments-the availability of jobs, of accommodation, rehabilitation, and training, the legal supports and protections, and the accessibility and generosity of SSI and other government transfer programs. Because the 1996 welfare reforms removed entitlement to many public assistance programs, SSI policy decisions must also, increasingly, take into account the actions of state and local governments.
In the end, the more important question is not whether the SSI program induces behavioral changes, but whether these changes are small relative to the social gains from redistributing income to less advantaged persons. In general, there is a social consensus that it is important to protect people against the economic consequences of age and disability. But because a socially appropriate eligibility standard for SSI is difficult to assess, a more stringent set of definitions will deny benefits to some who are less capable of work than is socially acceptable. More lenient criteria, however, involve a trade-off: given the presence of uncertainty, do the social benefits outweigh the efficiency costs of giving benefits to some who do not "deserve" them-who are more capable of work?
Adults with disabilities
Despite a large literature on the magnitude of the moral hazard effects of SSDI, AFDC, and food stamps, little research exists on the moral hazard problem in SSI. 8 While it is tempting to look to the research on other programs to gain insight into how the SSI program affects the behavior of low-income adults with disabilities, doing so is problematic. Comparisons to SSDI are constrained by the fact that the typical SSDI applicant has very different characteristics from 9. Medicaid can be lost for those not meeting the 1619(b) program requirements. Those eligible for 1619(b) get to keep their Medicaid coverage for some period beyond when they exceed the meanstest.
-15-the typical SSI applicant, who is mostly younger and poorer, more likely to come from an ethnic or racial minority, to have functional limitations arising from mental conditions, less education, and fewer work skills and experience. Comparisons to other means-tested programs eliminate some of these problems, but are troubled by their broader scope of coverage and easier entry and exit (i.e., no disability screening).
The small amount of research that does exist on the behavior of SSI applicants or recipients shows that the average SSI recipient faces substantial disincentives to leave the rolls.
Recent research shows that only a small fraction of SSI applicants work in the years leading up to their application. This limited work history combined with the long process of establishing that they have a medical condition that prevents them from working makes it difficult for beneficiaries to locate employment that compensates them for the loss of income associated with moving off of SSI and into the labor market. Finally, those who consider returning to work may be subject to very high marginal tax rates, in the form of reduced benefits from SSI and other transfer programs, plus the regular assortment of federal, state, and local taxes, as well as the potential loss of medical insurance (Medicaid).
9 Combined these implicit and explicit taxes can produce very high marginal tax rates for SSI recipients. For example, in 1994 a single male SSI recipient faced net tax rates ranging from 23 percent ($0 earnings) to 89 percent ($522 earnings).
In the hopes of offsetting some of these disincentives, adult recipients of SSI are eligible for a variety of federally funded and state-administered vocational rehabilitation programs; the pool of eligible providers was expanded in 1999 by the legislation called, significantly, the -16-Ticket to Work/Work Incentives Improvement Act. But efforts to encourage SSI recipients to return to work have proved discouraging. The SSA conducted two large-scale return-to-work demonstration projects to study the effectiveness of providing rehabilitation and employment services to SSI beneficiaries; these were the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, TETD (1985-87), and Project Network (1992-95) . Both programs called for volunteers. The first focused on mentally retarded beneficiaries, the second on beneficiaries with a wider range of diagnoses. Both projects were evaluated using random-assignment methodologies. For both, the conclusions were similar: TETD produced significant earnings gains for participants over six years, but the small impact on SSI payments was not nearly sufficient to cover the average cost of providing services to participants. In Project Network, earnings gains in the first two years were enough to offset reductions in SSI and SSDI benefits, but did not offset the costs of administration and training, and a third year follow-up showed that earnings gains had declined to zero. In both programs, the fraction of those eligible who volunteered was very small, around 5 percent. This suggests that transitional employment services are unlikely to have a large effect on the SSI population as a whole.
Families of children with disabilities
The primary justification for awarding cash benefits to poor families containing a disabled child is that they face economic burdens associated with their child's poor health.
These burdens may include lost earnings as well as medical expenses, but SSI child benefits are not based on an earnings replacement or expenditure offset formula; they are simply meanstested against current income. With current data, it is difficult to know whether families of children with disabilities became low-income due to earnings declines and/or increases in expenses associated with the onset of the child's disability or whether the families which qualify -17-for SSI benefits had low incomes before the onset of the child's disability. In the latter case, the extra burdens of the disability would not the root cause of their poverty.
The moral hazard faced by families whose child receives SSI benefits-the incentive to have their child become and remain eligible for SSI-depends to some degree on their economic circumstances before the child became disabled. If the typical family is a middle-income family whose economic well-being declines drastically when their child becomes disabled, a cash benefit that only partially offsets these losses is unlikely to be a real disincentive to work or to the child's recovery. But for families that are already economically vulnerable, SSI benefits for a disabled child may replace or even increase family income.
It has been estimated that perhaps as many of two-thirds of the children coming onto the SSI rolls in the early 1990s, after the Zebley decision, were in families already receiving some type of welfare assistance. 10 Other things equal, families eligible for multiple programs are likely to select those that provide them with the highest net benefit. SSI is associated with higher costs (more stringent application rules, greater stigma, etc.), but as the benefits associated with other programs shrink in comparison, more families may be willing to incur these costs to improve their economic circumstances. According to Kubik (1999) -18-children-particularly mental impairments-in states with low welfare benefits than in states with high welfare benefits. At the same time, work is affected. The Zebley decision appears to have had a significant dampening effect on the employment of unmarried women without a high school education, and increases in SSI benefits lower the probability that poorly educated household heads will work.
11 In general, the evidence suggests that working-age adults and families of children with disabilities are moving from other welfare programs to SSI.
SSI: An Old Program in a New Era
As noted earlier, SSI was born out of a compromise between those wanting to provide a guaranteed income floor under all Americans and those wishing to limit it to individuals not expected to work, at that time, the aged, blind, and disabled. Times have changed since this original compromise. Individuals are living and working longer, the normal retirement age for Social Security benefits has been raised, the Americans with Disabilities Act has granted people with disabilities a legal right to access to employment, and congress has agreed that nearly all Americans (even young, single, mothers with children) are expected to work. For policymakers, this creates a conundrum: Should people with disabilities be expected to work or not?
This conundrum has been brought to the forefront by recent trends in employment and benefit receipt among those with disabilities ( Figure 3) . Figure 3 shows employment rates of working-age men and women with self-reported disabilities and the number of individuals receiving benefits for 1980-2001. As the figure shows, while employment rates for those with self-reported disabilities rose through the economic expansion of the late 1980s, they have fallen -19-almost continuously since, even during the strong expansion of the 1990s. At the same time that employment has been falling, the number of individuals on disability benefits (SSI and SSDI) has been rising.
While researchers debate the reasons for the declining employment and rising benefit rates of men and women with disabilities during the 1990s, policy makers are debating whether these outcomes are signs of success or failure of U.S. disability policy. For some advocates of those with disabilities, the increasing disability benefit rolls reflect an appropriate increase in support for a group of individuals with limited labor market opportunities. For others, the increased rolls reflect shortcomings of a transfer-focused policy that failed to provide the necessary supports (e.g., universal health insurance, rehabilitation, and job services) to allow individuals to select work over benefits. For others still, the outcomes observed during the 1990s are simply evidence of the law of unintended consequences in policy making, where policies to promote economic well-being (in the case of benefits) and work (in the case of the ADA) actually increased the disability benefit rolls and reduced employment.
Whatever perspective one takes on the increase in the SSI disability population, as the population of SSI changes and the group of those not expected to work narrows, the structure of SSI comes into question. First, despite some attempts to offset the negative work incentives in SSI, exits to employment, even among this relatively younger population, are rare. The high tax rates and relatively generous benefits of SSI, which made sense for populations not expected to work, are a serious disincentive in a population where work is possible. For those with a capacity to work, SSI and the eligibility for other programs that it conveys can become a classic "poverty trap." Since the Zebley decision, moreover, nearly a million children have entered the SSI rolls. Given the broad commitment to integrating people with disabilities into the workforce -20-embodied in the ADA and welfare-to-work programs of the 1990s, major initiatives to integrate these children into the workforce rather than onto adult disability rolls are likely to be considered. Policies targeting young people with disabilities would surely be better focused on education, rehabilitation, job training, and accommodation than on increasing or expanding transfers. Especially for the children, investing more time, energy, and resources in education and development than in income supplementation for their families might be desirable.
Second, in the absence of a universal, guaranteed-income program for all Americans of the kind envisioned in the Nixon administration's FAP, the operational flexibility of the eligibility criteria for SSI has made the program sensitive to economic downturns and to increases in the pool of vulnerable people. The recent legislative changes in the social safety net and the increasing percentage of the population aged 50 and over-a point at which the incidence of disability rises sharply-in combination with the end of the record growth period of the 1990s business cycle and the slide of the economy into recession makes further increase in the rolls likely.
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